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This Article examines the tension between freedom of speech 
and laws restricting the defamation of religion, using the case study 
of Singapore and the Amos Yee case.  In 2015, four days after the 
death of revered former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Amos Yee, a 
sixteen-year-old blogger, posted a video called “Lee Kuan Yew is 
finally dead!” and, one day later, an image on his blog entitled 
“Lee Kuan Yew buttfucking Margaret Thatcher.”  As part of Yee’s 
eight-minute-long video, Yee spent forty seconds criticizing Lee by 
drawing an unfavorable analogy between Lee and Jesus.  As a 
result, Yee was charged under section 298 of the Penal Code, the 
law prohibiting the “uttering of words with the deliberate intent to 
wound the religious or racial feelings.”  While international news 
highlighted Yee’s prosecution as a blatant attempt to silence 
criticism of the former Prime Minister, the courts held steadfast in 
their belief that Yee’s words were hurtful towards Christians, and 
that offending the religious sentiments of any community would not 
be tolerated in Singapore.  This Article will review the facts of the 
case, the history of the law, and its application.  It will also attempt 
to situate the law in the larger Defamation of Religions resolution 
debate in the United Nations from 1999–2010 and review legal 
restrictions on free speech in the United States and Europe. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, and the 
2005 Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in Denmark, 
tension between a fierce defense of free speech and the growing call 
to regulate speech on sensitive matters such as religion, particularly 
since September 11, is increasingly becoming an East vs. West, and 
a freedom of speech vs. freedom of religion issue.  From 1999 to 
2010, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation advocated for a 
resolution through the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (now United Nations Human Rights Council) to codify a 
right for religions not to be offended.  Drafted by Pakistan, the 
resolution deplores intolerance and discrimination based on religion 
and prohibits the dissemination of ideas that may incite violence, 
intolerance or xenophobia.  While most Asian and African countries 
voted in favor of the resolution every year, no Western country has 
ever voted in favor of the resolution.1  The debates around this U.N. 
resolution illustrates how the current dispute over restrictions on 
religiously sensitive speech has often played out in the dichotomy of 
                                                                                                               
 1 Caleb Holzaepfel, Can I Say That?: How an International Blasphemy Law Pits the 
Freedom of Religion Against the Freedom of Speech, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 597, 631 
(2014). 
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West vs. non-West, with both sides advocating for an absolute 
universal standard. 
These debates, however, overlook some pertinent 
considerations relating to history and context.  For instance, 
Western countries, in opposing the resolution, argue that the 
resolution restricts freedom of speech and expression and that the 
law is thinly veiled as an attempt to move Islam “beyond criticism 
and beyond any perceived insult.”2  However, even though many 
Western nations vehemently oppose the Defamation of Religions 
resolution on the grounds that it restricts freedom of speech, these 
same nations have histories of restricting speech regarding religion 
in their own jurisdictions.  The United States has a long history of 
blasphemy laws, and Europe continues to restrict speech regarding 
the denial of the Holocaust.  Furthermore, the Defamation of 
Religions resolution proposed by Pakistan was based on laws that 
had colonial roots that can be traced to the Indian Penal Code of 
1871, which was drafted by the British.  While Singapore has not 
participated in these debates, an interesting comparison can be 
drawn between Singapore and the nations involved in the debates.  
A study of the Singapore case provides an opportunity to go beyond 
the “West” vs. “non-West”/Muslim nations dichotomy.  Singapore 
is not a predominantly Muslim nation but has laws in place similar 
to the resolution that regulates speech that may harm religious 
sentiment.  These laws, like the resolution, can also be traced to the 
Indian Penal Code of 1871. 
Moreover, through exploring these diverse approaches to 
legal restrictions on free speech and religion, this Article also 
attempts to explore how the law is used to contain, deflect, or 
enlarge rights in a particular society, time period, and political 
context.  As described by legal anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, 
this approach involves “attention to social context,” including 
historical and socio-cultural circumstances.3  Abdullahi An-Na’im 
highlights that events like the Rushdie affair and the international 
divarications relating to free speech and religion demonstrate a shift 
from using laws to settle issues at the local level in “relatively 
                                                                                                               
 2 Id. 
 3 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Anthropology, in LAW AS PROCESS: AN 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 214, 215 (1978).  See also LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A 
READER (Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005) (providing various scholars’ works on understanding 
the law and its impact on societies through anthropological approaches). 
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homogenous settings,” to local laws now becoming contested at the 
increasingly diversified and politicized global level.4  Yet, in the 
wake of these changes, it must not be forgotten that laws are 
embedded and operate within particular local contexts.  Thus, this 
Article examines the legal restrictions on free speech in the “West” 
and in Singapore, taking into account the contexts in which these 
laws are embedded, in order to argue that there is a need to consider 
local, historical and social contexts in assessing laws in general and 
restrictions on free speech in particular. 
In Singapore, while state regulation may seem to restrict 
freedom of religion, prominent anthropologist Vineeta Sinha argues 
that, “[l]egal and bureaucratic regulation does not necessarily curtail 
religious expression” and suggests that regulating religion in 
Singapore may in fact facilitate greater religious freedom. 5  
Secularism, therefore, takes a different form, with the state 
managing religion in many ways.  Instead of “secularism,” for 
instance, An-Na’im uses the concept “secular state.”6  He argues 
that there is not one type or definition of “secularism.”  The author 
also posits that the strict separation of religion and state is based on 
a Western model that is not universal.7    Instead, he argues that 
secularism exists in different ways in different contexts.  He argues, 
therefore, for a “conception of secularism as a product of deeply 
contextual negotiation in each society,” 8  specifically, “as a 
negotiation between the religious neutrality of the state and the 
public role of religion.”9  Thus, similar to the legal anthropological 
emphasis on context, An-Na’im argues for the importance of 
context in his discussion of secularism.  Although the Singapore 
state is officially religiously neutral, it is heavily involved in the 
management of religion, along with the management of other rights, 
such as freedom of speech.10 
                                                                                                               
 4 Abdullahi An-Na’im, What Do We Mean by Universal?, in ISLAM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM 3, 10 (Mashood A. Baderin ed., 2010). 
 5 VINEETA SINHA, RELIGION-STATE ENCOUNTERS IN HINDU DOMAINS: FROM THE 
STRAITS SETTLEMENTS TO SINGAPORE 254 (2011) (alteration in original). 
 6 ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE 
OF SHARI’A 9 (2008). 
 7 An-Na’im, supra note 4, at 48. 
 8 AN-NA’IM, supra note 6, at 37. 
 9 Id. at 214. 
 10 See SINHA, supra note 5. 
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This managerial approach to freedom of speech and religion 
can be seen in the Public Prosecutor v. Amos Yee case.11  On March 
27, 2015, four days after revered former Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew passed away, sixteen-year-old Singaporean blogger Amos Yee 
posted a video called “Lee Kuan Yew is finally dead!” criticizing 
former Prime Minister Lee and his policies.12  As part of Yee’s 
eight-minute-long video, Yee spent forty seconds criticizing Lee by 
referring to Christianity, drawing an unfavorable analogy between 
Lee and Jesus, and declaring both similar in being “power-hungry 
and malicious.”13  Yee also posted a blog entry entitled “Lee Kuan 
Yew buttfucking Margaret Thatcher” with an image depicting Lee 
and Thatcher’s photos superimposed on a stick-figure drawing of 
two characters in a sexual position.14  Many internet users took great 
offense to the video and picture, and within hours, members of the 
public began filing dozens of police reports.  The police acted 
swiftly, and two days after the posting, Yee’s home was raided and 
he was arrested.15  Yee was charged under section 292(1)(a) of the 
Penal Code regarding the transmission of obscene drawings, and 
under section 298 for deliberately intending to wound religious 
feelings.16   
In this Article, section 298 of Singapore’s Penal Code and 
the recent Amos Yee case will be used to explore a non-Western 
and non-Islamic majority nation that maintains a law on the books 
that is similar to the Defamation of Religions resolution.  
Singapore’s distinctive characteristics, including its heterogeneity, 
make it a useful case study to examine the tension between freedom 
of speech and freedom of religion.  In this Article, the situation of 
Singapore with regards to “religious harmony” and restrictions on 
religiously sensitive speech is explored in order to illustrate the role 
                                                                                                               
 11 Pub. Prosecutor v. Amos Yee Pang Sang, [2015] SGDC 215 ¶ 27 (Sing.). 
 12 Id. ¶ 27. 
 13 Id. ¶ 32. 
 14 Carlton Tan, Court Verdict Will Determine if Pornography Law Applies to Political 
Satire in Amos Yee Case, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (May 12, 2015), https://asian
correspondent.com/2015/05/court-verdict-pornography-law-political-satire-amos-yee/ 
[http://perma.cc/DCQ5-N3HF]. 
 15 Shah Salimat, Police Arrest Amos Yee Over Anti-Lee Kuan Yew Video, YAHOO 
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2015), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/police-report-lodged-over-amos-yee-
anti-lee-kuan-yew-video-063152918.html [http://perma.cc/B5M7-QZEV]. 
 16 Pub. Prosecutor v. Amos Yee Pang Sang, supra note 11, ¶ 1. 
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of context in the formation and implications of section 298 of the 
Singapore Penal Code.  Furthermore, the aim of this Article is not to 
take a position on the question of whether religiously sensitive 
speech should be regulated.  Instead, through an examination of 
legal restrictions on free speech in the United States, Europe, and 
Singapore, the Article seeks to illustrate the importance of context 
in assessing laws on issues of human rights like freedom of speech.  
Lastly, the case study of section 298 is an example of how laws that 
restrict religiously insensitive speech as advocated by such 
initiatives as the Defamation of Religions resolution may work in 
practice, showing some of the problems associated with these laws, 
and how context significantly affects implications of laws. 
This Article consists of three sections.  First, the Article will 
discuss international debates regarding the Defamation of Religions 
resolution in the United Nations, blasphemy laws in the United 
States, denial of Holocaust laws in Europe, and whether the 
Singapore case can insert an alternative example outside of what is 
becoming a “West” vs. “Islam” debate.  Next, the Article will 
discuss the details of Amos Yee’s case.  It will review the events 
leading up to the case, the disposition of the trial court, and the High 
Court’s review of the trial court’s interpretation of section 298.  
This section will also discuss the history, language, and legislative 
intent behind section 298 regarding “uttering words, etc., with 
deliberate intent to wound the religious or racial feelings of any 
person.”  Finally, the Article will explore the contemporary 
Singapore condition, examining the nation’s attitude toward 
religiously sensitive speech post-independence.  It is hoped that this 
Article can spark a discussion on the management of free speech 
using a non-Western nation, while investigating the state of free 
speech in Singapore. 
II. INTERNATIONAL DEBATES ON THE DEFAMATION OF 
RELIGION 
In the late 1980’s, British Indian writer Salman Rushdie 
published his controversial novel Satanic Verses. The book 
triggered massive protests throughout the world for its depiction of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/3
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Islam and the Prophet Muhammad.17  In response to the Rushdie 
affair and an increase of anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the 
world, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), now the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, began to advocate through 
legal means that the defamation of religion constitutes a violation of 
human dignity. 18   In 1999, Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, 
introduced a draft resolution entitled “Defamation of Islam.” 19  
After a number of countries on the United Nations Commission for 
Human Rights complained that the resolution was too Islam-centric, 
the OIC rewrote the resolution to be more general in nature, retitled 
it “Defamation of Religions,” and based on these accommodations, 
the resolution was passed without a vote that same year.20  After the 
September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, a growing concern over the 
rise of Islamophobia, xenophobia, and discrimination led to the 
passage of the resolution every year until 2006, when the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was replaced by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC).21  After the HRC 
replaced the UNCHR in 2006, the HRC again approved the 
resolution, and this time, submitted it to the General Assembly.22  In 
the General Assembly, 111 member states voted in favor of the 
resolution, fifty-four voted against, and eighteen abstained.23 
However, support for the resolution began to wane.  With 
the change in structure of the UNCHR to the HRC, new members 
                                                                                                               
 17 Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights 
Law, and the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375, 388, 416, 434 
(1996). 
 18 Lorenz Langer, The Rise (and Fall?) of Defamation of Religions, 35 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 257 (2010). 
 19 U.N.C.H.R., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/1999/L.40 [http://perma.cc/
A4L3-G5TQ]. 
 20 U.N.C.H.R. Res. 1999/82, at 280–81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 (Apr. 30, 1999), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/1999/167\ [http://perma.cc/
J34Q-CEG3]. 
 21 Rebecca J. Dobras, Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations: An 
Analysis of the United Nations’ Combating Defamation of Religions Resolutions and 
Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 352 (2009). 
 22 G.A. Res. 61/164 (Dec. 19, 2006), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N06/504/27/pdf/N0650427.pdf?OpenElement, [http://perma.cc/JXC2-4TVL]. 
 23 Press Release, General Assembly Adopts 46 Third Committee Texts on Human 
Rights Issues, Refugees, Self-Determination, Racism, Social Development, GA/10562 
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10562.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/
WEK3-T3HY]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] MAINTAINING RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN SINGAPORE 193 
 
joined the new HRC and divergent views began to emerge.  
Between 2007 and 2011, a robust exchange between the OIC and 
the Western block, including the United States and the E.U., took 
place concerning whether the Defamation of Religions resolution 
was stifling free speech.  In 2009, in a follow up session to the 
“World Conference against Racism” (WCAR) in Durban, South 
Africa in September 2001, the HRC was tasked with the elaboration 
of complementary standards in accordance with paragraph 199 of 
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.24  In the first ad-
hoc committee, Syria and the OIC (as represented by Pakistan) 
stated that “a convention is needed to tackle Islamophobia by 
encouraging States to adopt appropriate legislation at the national 
level.”25  By 2010, negative responses to this position became more 
assertive.   Sweden, on behalf of the European Union, Mexico, on 
behalf of Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and 
Uruguay; Norway, Denmark, Poland, and France expressed their 
opposition to defamation of religions being regarded as a human 
rights legal concept, explaining that human rights were relevant to 
individuals but not religions.26 
Moreover, Sweden reiterated that the European Union firmly 
rejected in the strongest terms any new standard connected with the 
concept of “defamation of religions.”27  The United States noted that 
an individual’s belief in his or her own religion is deeply personal 
and that it would be impossible and inappropriate for an 
international legal framework or State to attempt to adjudicate or 
mediate when conflicts of religious beliefs arise.28  Germany stated 
that discrimination based on religion was different to defamation of 
                                                                                                               
 24 U.N.H.R.C. Dec. 3/103, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007), 
http://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/E/HRC/decisions/A-HRC-DEC-3-103.doc [http://perma.cc/
UXX3-9588]. 
 25 U.N.H.R.C., Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary 
Standards on Its First Session, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/88 (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/AdHoc/Report1stSession.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8JJ4-4F6H]. 
 26 U.N.H.R.C., Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary 
Standards on its Second Session, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/CRP.1 (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/files/A-HRC-13-CRP1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Y747-WFJ3]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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religions and the two should be kept separate.29  Portugal stated that 
if defamation of religions was a problem, then it was not necessarily 
human rights mechanisms and instruments that should be called 
upon to address the problem. 30   Moreover, “since 2008, and 
especially since the Durban Review Conference in April 2009, a 
clear change of discourse became apparent among U.N. member 
states from Latin America or Africa, [as they began] to slowly 
distance themselves from the OIC agenda.”31  These changes were 
partially a result from pressure exerted by the Western block.  
International and local NGOs such as the Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights Studies (CIHRS), the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
Article 19, and the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) 
also actively engaged in the debate.32 
It was not just nation-states and NGOs that were criticizing 
the Defamation of Religions resolution; academics also vociferously 
voiced their dissent.  According to one article, “After international 
debates and conversations such as these, blasphemy laws modeled 
in the style of Pakistan’s Penal Code became increasingly 
recognized as unacceptable—not only to the United States and 
Britain, but throughout the democratic world.” 33   Titles of law 
journal articles such as “Is the U.N. Endorsing Human Rights 
Violations?” 34  and “Defamation of Religions: The End of 
Pluralism?”35  also revealed a strong resistance to the resolution.  
Instances of heavy fines and imprisonment being handed down in 
blasphemy cases in Pakistan, professors in Egypt who were 
convicted of apostasy for interpreting the Koran metaphorically and 
not literally, and Saudi Arabian and Palestinian comments on 
television broadcasts that Jews were vampires who “bake cookies 
with the blood of Arabs,” were all presented as evidence that local 
versions of the Defamation of Religions resolution in OIC states 
                                                                                                               
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Julia Alfandari et al., Defamation of Religions: International Developments and 
Challenges on the Ground; SOAS International Human Rights Clinic Project (SOAS Sch. 
of Law, Research Paper No. 09/2011, 2011). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 620. 
 34 Dobras, supra note 21. 
 35 L. Bennett Graham, Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 69 (2009). 
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have been highly problematic.36  More complex legal arguments 
against the Defamation of Religions resolution also emerged.  
According to legal scholar Jeroen Temperman, “in shift[ing] the 
emphasis from the rights of individuals to the protection of 
religions . . . new grounds for limiting human rights are introduced 
that are not recognized by human rights law.”37  Needless to say, the 
sentiment in academic discourse, much like the debates in the HRC, 
was overwhelmingly critical. 
In 2011, a revolutionary wave of protests and uprisings, 
popularly referred to as Arab Spring, challenged the political status 
quo of many nations in the OIC.38  Perhaps in response, although 
the resolution continued to be voted on in the General Assembly, 
support for the resolution dwindled, and in that same year, the 
resolution was redrafted and changed its title to “Combating 
intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and 
discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons 
based on religion or belief.”39  The new resolution was adopted at 
the general assembly with widespread support. 40   Following its 
adoption by consensus, “numerous officials and non-governmental 
organizations[] lined up to applaud Resolution 16/18 as a death 
                                                                                                               
 36 Maxim Grinberg, Defamation of Religions v. Freedom of Expression: Finding the 
Balance in a Democratic Society. 18 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 197, 214 (2006). 
 37 Jeroen Temperman, Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist 
Societies: Facing the Challenge of Extreme Speech, 2011 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 729, 
730 (2011) (alteration in original).  See also, LORENZ LANGER, RELIGIOUS OFFENCE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 379 (2014) (“As a universally applicable norm system, international law is 
not suited to protect particularists sensibilities.”). 
 38 ANTONI ABAT I NINET & MARK TUSHNET, THE ARAB SPRING: AN ESSAY ON 
REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2015) (“The events in the Middle East and North 
Africa in late 2010 and early 2011 have been given the label ‘the Arab Spring’ . . . The 
events appeared to need some sort of label because they seemed—at the time and for a 
while thereafter—to indicate that nations in the region (not all the nations, but many of 
them) were undergoing substantial transformations in their systems of government.  They 
seemed to be moving from authoritarian systems toward more democratic and 
constitutionalist ones.”). 
 39 U.N.H.R.C. Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Mar. 21, 2011); See also 
Sejal Parmar, Uprooting ‘Defamation of Religions’ and Planting a New Approach to 
Freedom of Expression at the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 373, 397 (Tarlach McGonagle & Yvonne Donders eds., 2015) (“The OIC, led 
by Pakistan, knowing that it was sooner or later going to lose the battle over the 
resolutions, . . . decided that it would be preferable to propose a resolution that could gain 
consensus from Western and OIC States.”). 
 40 Id. at 399. 
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knell for defamation of religion.”41  One would think this would put 
some of the debate to rest.  However, the title of law professor 
Robert Blitt’s law review article “Defamation of Religion: Rumors 
of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated” highlights that some scholars 
are adamant in ensuring the Defamation of Religions debate never 
re-emerges, and if it does, that sharp criticism awaits.42 
While much of the disparaging analyses of the Defamation 
of Religions resolution are grounded in sound logic and evidence, 
they at the same time argue in somewhat hyperbolic terms, positing 
the “liberated west” with the “oppressive OIC.”  The resolution is 
often depicted as reproducing autocratic laws and structures of 
government, creating a chilling effect on free speech, and 
oppressing minorities.  Moreover, even if the resolution speaks 
generally of “Defamation of Religions,” its numerous references to 
Islam prompt critics to refer to it as the “Defamation of Islam” 
resolution.43  Again, without dismissing these arguments completely, 
what some of them overshadow is the fact that the United States had 
blasphemy laws that prosecuted anti-Christian speech for over 100 
years.  Furthermore, while the European Union argues that laws that 
protect religions, and not individuals, should not be considered 
human rights, then are Europe’s laws concerning the denial of 
Holocaust a human rights issue?  These topics will be explored in 
the following section. 
A. Blasphemy in the United States 
Although the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
                                                                                                               
 41 Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 62 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 347, 364 (2011). 
 42 Id. at 381–82. 
 43 Although it is acknowledged that the initial title of the resolution was “Defamation 
of Islam” some scholars have refused to accept that the title has changed, arguing that the 
content effectively protects Islam only.  See Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom Up Journey of 
“Defamation of Religion” from Muslim States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the 
Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in 56 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 
SPECIAL ISSUE HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POSSIBILITIES/NEW PROBLEMS 121, 162 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2011) (emphasis added) (“The OIC’s position on defamation of Islam exposes its 
desire to protect select religious beliefs at the expense of either diluting or altogether 
casting aside existing international norms relating to freedom of expression, freedom 
religion or belief, and nondiscrimination.”). 
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ” some states 
still keep blasphemy laws on the books.  These laws tend to have a 
strong Christian bias, such as Massachusetts’ law which 
criminalizes “reproaching Jesus Christ or the Holy Ghost.” 44  
Michigan considered it a misdemeanor to take Jesus’ name in vain 
when cursing or swearing up until 2000.45  Although these laws are 
still in the statute books, there are many operationally defunct laws 
preserved in statute books throughout the country, and the case can 
be easily made that blasphemy laws are virtually unenforceable.46  It 
has been widely argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, makes “the precedent in the United 
States . . . to consider freedom of speech an exceedingly broad right 
extending to blasphemers,”47 and that “in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. 
Wilson, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated blasphemy 
regulations throughout the United States.”48  On the other hand, it 
can also be argued that the court’s holding only applies to motion 
pictures.49  Evidence that the blasphemy law issue is not completely 
resolved in the United States can be found in the fact that 
blasphemy laws have been passed in some states by overwhelming 
                                                                                                               
 44 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 36 (2016). 
 45 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.103 (2016) (“Any person who has arrived at the age of 
discretion, who shall profanely curse or damn or swear by the name of God, Jesus Christ or 
the Holy Ghost, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).  
 46 See Philip K. Howard, Obsolete Law—The Solutions, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/obsolete-law-0151-the-
solutions/255141/ [https://perma.cc/5ZCL-SHRK] (proposing solutions to inefficiencies 
created by obsolete laws).  
 47 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 603 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495 (1952)). 
 48 Justin Kirk Houser, Is Hate Speech Becoming the New Blasphemy? Lessons from 
an American Constitutional Dialectic, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 571, 590 (2009). 
 49 In fact, in the final line of the opinion, the court states, “We hold only that, under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor’s 
conclusion that it is ‘sacrilegious.’”  Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 
(1952) (emphasis added).  While courts continue to rely on Burstyn as setting the standard 
in denying censorship based on “blasphemous” language, courts have also had to continue 
to determine whether or to what extent certain media are covered by the first amendment. 
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (concerning video games); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867–70 (1997) (concerning the Internet); Red Lion Broad. 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969) (concerning broadcasting).  See also LEONARD W. 
LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN 
RUSHDIE 525 (1993) (“The Supreme Court has never decided a blasphemy case.”). 
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majorities as late as 1977, and litigation only as late as 2010 have 
taken place to challenge such laws.50 
Although blasphemy laws in the United States are 
essentially dead law, and instances where individuals are charged 
under these laws are exceedingly rare, these laws are still part of 
American history—a history that emphasized order in a largely 
Christian society.  From America’s earliest encounters with 
blasphemy in the Salem witch trials from 1659–1660, to the famous 
case of John Ruggles, a man who shouted “Jesus Christ was a 
bastard, and his mother must be a whore” while at the door of a 
tavern after drinking heavily, America’s blasphemy laws were 
highly Christian-centric.  In People v. Ruggles, the court remarked, 
The people of this state, in common with the people 
of this country, profess the general doctrines of 
Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; 
and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not 
only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, 
but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, 
is a gross violation of decency and good order.51 
Because Americans were considered to be Christian, it was 
important for courts to protect the community from blasphemous 
speech to preserve “decency and good order.”52  Following the same 
line of reasoning, in Updegraph v. Commonwealth, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: 
“ . . . Christianity . . . is the law of our land . . . if 
from a regard to decency and the good order of 
society, profane swearing, breach of the Sabbath, and 
blasphemy, are punishable by civil magistrates, these 
are not punished as sins or offences against God, but 
crimes injurious to, and having a malignant influence 
on society.”53 
                                                                                                               
 50 Pennsylvania overwhelmingly passed a law prohibiting blasphemy in its legislature, 
with 193 votes to 1, in 1977.  See Corporate Name, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303(c)(2)(ii)) 
(repealed 2014), invalidated by Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 51 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
 52 Id. at 294. 
 53 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 409 (Pa. 1824). 
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Even though one can very convincingly argue that America 
has changed dramatically since Ruggles and Updegraph, it would be 
very hard to deny that such laws have existed in American history. 
It was only in 1952 with the Burstyn case that U.S. courts 
pronounced clearly that blasphemy laws violated U.S. freedom of 
speech protections found in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.54  And although courts have been quick to strike down 
blasphemy laws, such as the Maryland Supreme Court reversal of a 
conviction of a man who was found guilty for exclaiming, “Get 
your Goddamn hands off me” during a fight in 1970, 55  or the 
Federal District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania’s declaratory 
judgment that Pennsylvania’s blasphemy statute violates the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution after an 
individual challenged the statutes in order to register the name of his 
company as “I Choose Hell Productions LLC,” 56  instances of 
persecuting “anti-Christian” beliefs and behavior are on the rise.  In 
2009, a speech by prominent evolutionary biologist Richard 
Dawkins at the University of Oklahoma was investigated by the 
state legislature for promoting an “unproven and unpopular” 
theory.57  In 2015, Apostolic Christian Kim Davis refused to honor 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges by declining to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 58   In the 2016 
Republican presidential primaries, Donald Trump galvanized 
support by pandering to evangelical Christian voters and claiming 
Roe v. Wade, the landmark decision that forbade states from 
banning abortions, was a mistake that should be overturned.59 
                                                                                                               
 54 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 55 LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM 
MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 527 (1993); State v. West, 263 A.2d 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1970). 
 56 Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 57 Greg Lukianoff, Oklahoma Legislature Investigates Richard Dawkins’ Free Speech, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2009, 05:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-
lukianoff/oklahoma-legislature-inve_b_177473.html [http://perma.cc/4EZW-TM97]. 
 58 Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage 
Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/
us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html [http://perma.cc/228B-47LH]. 
 59 Cavan Sieczkowski, Trump: I Would ‘Strongly Consider’ Appointing Judges to 
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The United States has over 100 years of blasphemy laws, 
and even if the laws are largely dead, with these laws’ overtly 
Christian bias, along with the growing presence of the Christian 
right, it becomes difficult to ignore America’s long and complicated 
history of tension between freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion.  Yet as arguments unfold in favor of and against the U.N. 
resolution on Defamation of Religions, in light of the 2015 Charlie 
Hebdo attacks in France and the 2005 Jyllands-Posten Muhammad 
cartoons controversy in Denmark, arguments for the resolution are 
framed as contrary to American secular beliefs and as a “thinly 
veiled desire of Muslim states to move their religion beyond 
criticism and beyond any perceived insult.”60  While it is true that 
the United States consistently opposed the resolution, this fact is 
presented as if the United States was enlightening, “educating,” or 
even saving the world from those who vote in favor of the 
resolution.61  According to one article, “diverse people across the 
Western world live in an environment of general peace and mutual 
respect no matter their color or religious affiliation” and “Western 
Christianity accepts criticism and insults as part of the international 
cultural and religious paradigm despite violently suppressing 
blasphemy and heretical teaching in the past.” 62   The article 
continues, “in contrast, a large portion of Muslims internationally 
have made no attempt to hide their distaste towards those who insult 
Islam . . . ”63  Blasphemy laws are further depicted as often being 
used to “settle personal scores and drive away business competition,” 
or “suppress reformist dissent or minority sects of Islam.”64  In short, 
“such laws are used to intimidate and create a hostile environment 
for religious minorities.”65 
These depictions of the Defamation of Religions debate 
posit “traditional American freedom of speech standards” against 
“religions [that] are directly responsible for human rights violations, 
oppression, violence, and international terrorism.” 66   Holzaepfel 
                                                                                                               
 60 Holzaepfel, supra note 1. 
 61 Graham, supra note 35, at 72 (“As the parsing of words and negotiations has 
evolved over the past decade, delegations have gradually become more educated on the 
concept of defamation of religions and its danger to the human rights structure.”). 
 62 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 630, 634. 
 63 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 630. 
 64 Graham, supra note 35, at 80. 
 65 Graham, supra note 35, at 81. 
 66 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 621, 638 (alteration in original). 
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therefore argues that “there must be an avenue to fight back through 
public speech.”67  While it is true that American courts have found 
blasphemy laws unconstitutional, “traditional American” standards 
seem more of a construction and an ideal, rather than a clear cut 
reality.  Also, considering America’s own history of blasphemy 
laws, and logic behind such laws, to claim that the Defamation of 
Religions resolution is a thinly veiled attempt to place Islam beyond 
criticism would be to ignore that these same laws were justified as 
preserving a civil and orderly Christian society for nearly 100 years 
in the United States. 
Because “traditional American freedom of speech” values 
are often seen as “traditional Western democratic” principles, and 
since the “West” includes Europe, the next section will review the 
existing Defamation of Religions laws in Europe as it pertains to 
Judaism and the Holocaust. 
B. Laws Against Holocaust Denial in Europe 
While the United States currently takes the position that 
freedom of speech is a “traditional American value” and that it 
should be protected and left generally unrestricted, Europe is less 
laissez-faire.  In the past several decades, speech regarding the 
denial of the Holocaust has become increasingly more regulated, 
from the Gaysott Laws in France, to section 130(3) in Germany.68   
In the United Kingdom, general provisions in the law make it 
possible to prosecute individuals with “revisionist ideologies.” 69  
This section will briefly discuss European laws against denying the 
Holocaust, recent European Union decisions that endorse such laws, 
and European and American justifications for such laws. 
In Finland, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Greece, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, “revisionist 
                                                                                                               
 67 Holzaepfel, supra note 1, at 638. 
 68 Loi 90-615 du 13 julliet 1990 tendant a reprimer tout acte raciste, antisemite, ou 
xenophobe [Law 90-615 of July 13, 1990 to Suppress Any Racist, Anti-Semitic or 
Xenophobic Act], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 14, 1990, p. 8333 (Fr.); STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL 
CODE], § 130(3), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_
stgb.html#p1241 [http://perma.cc/BH5R-GCHV] (Ger.). 
 69 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2000] EWHC (QB) 115 [1.2] (Eng.).  In this case, a 
libel charge prompted a thorough examination of David Irving’s work to determine 
whether his ideas were in fact “revisionist.”   
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ideologies” can be punished under general criminal provisions 
dealing with the maintenance of public peace or laws dealing with 
statements and behaviors motivated by racist intent.70  Although not 
directly tried under these “revisionist ideology” laws, David Irving’s 
case demonstrates how ideas can be greatly scrutinized under such 
laws.  In 2000, David Irving sued Penguin Books and Prof. Deborah 
Lipstadt for publishing a statement that Irving was “a Nazi apologist 
and an admirer of Hitler” and that he “resorted to the distortion of 
facts and to the manipulation of documents in support of his 
contention that the Holocaust did not take place.”71  After a lengthy 
trial in which several expert witnesses explained to the court how 
Irving’s ideas were faulty, the court held that Irving was indeed 
“deliberately skew[ing] the evidence to bring it into line with his 
political beliefs.”72  As a result of losing the trial, Irving was left 
bankrupt and forced to sell his home in order to afford the legal 
fees.73 
Other countries are more explicit in their regulation of 
speech that denies the Holocaust.  Currently, Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland have laws specifically prohibiting the denial of the 
Holocaust.74  France’s Gaysott Act of 1990 is so expansive that it 
prohibits the wearing of “uniforms, badges or emblems resembling 
those worn by members of an organization that was declared 
criminal” by the Nuremberg Tribunal.75  Under these laws, in 1996, 
a far-right party member Bruno Gollnisch had his teaching position 
suspended for five years, salary cut in half, received a suspended 
three-month prison sentence, fined 5,000 euros, and was ordered to 
pay for the court decision to be published in the papers and 55,000 
euros in damages.  All of this was in part the result of a statement in 
                                                                                                               
 70 Laurent Pech, The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe: Toward a (Qualified) EU-
Wide Criminal Prohibition, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW 185, 198 (Thomas 
Hochmann & Ludovic Hennebel eds., 2011). 
 71 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., supra note 69, ¶ 1.2. 
 72 Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., supra note 69, ¶ 13.144 (alteration in original). 
 73 Vikram Dodd & D.D. Guttenplan, Holocaust Denier Made Bankrupt, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/mar/05/humanities.highereducation 
[http://perma.cc/LDZ7-PF4T]; Vikram Dodd, Failed Libel Action Costs Irving His Home, 
GUARDIAN (May 22, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/may/22/irving.
humanities [http://perma.cc/KSJ3-TM3L]. 
 74 Russell L. Weaver et al., Holocaust Denial and Governmentally Declared “Truth”: 
French and American Perspectives, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 495, 496 (2009). 
 75 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. R645-1 (Fr.).  
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2004 in which he disclosed, “I want things to be clear, as far as I am 
concerned, I do not deny the existence of homicidal gas 
chambers . . . but on the issue of the number of people killed, 
historians should be free to discuss it.”76 
Moreover, many countries, such as Germany and Austria, 
have enacted even stricter laws given their “dark past” and 
perceived sense of moral responsibility to overcome it.77  In 1994, 
Germany’s Penal Code was amended to include section 130(3), 
which states: 
 “Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, 
denies or downplays an act committed under the rule 
of National Socialism of the kind indicated in section 
6 (1) of the Code of International Criminal Law, in a 
manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall 
be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or 
a fine.”78   
By 2005, the law was enhanced to include section 130(4), 
which added that violating the “dignity of the victims by approving 
of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of arbitrary force 
shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a 
fine.”79  On the basis of similar laws in Austria, the same David 
Irving who was bankrupted and forced to sell his home in the UK in 
2000 was arrested in 2006 for statements made in a speech 
seventeen years earlier in which he called for the end of the “gas 
chambers fairy tale.” 80   After pleading guilty to the charge of 
                                                                                                               
 76 Russell L. Weaver et al., The Creation of Transnational Administrative Structures 
Governing Internet Communication, 78 MO. L. REV. 527, 544 (2013).  It should be noted 
that Gollnisch’s conviction was reversed by the Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, 
on June 24, 2009.  Bruno Gollnisch Blanchi par la Cour de Cassation, NOUVEL 
OBSERVATEUR (June 24, 2009), http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20090624.
OBS1737/bruno-gollnisch-blanchi-par-la-cour-de-cassation.html [http://perma.cc/RA8J-
UZY6]. 
 77 Pech, supra note 70, at 190. 
 78 STRAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 68, § 130(3). 
 79 STRAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 68, § 130(4). 
 80 David Irving Jailed for Holocaust Denial, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2006), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/20/austria.thefarright [http://perma.cc/F5FD-QSE9]. 
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denying the Holocaust, a crime that could face up to ten years of 
imprisonment, Irving was sentenced to three years in prison.81 
In 2007, the European Union passed legislation to outlaw 
Holocaust denial throughout the then twenty-seven-member bloc, 
while giving these nations the option to not enforce the law if such a 
prohibition did not already exist in their laws.82   The European 
Union Framework Decision for Combating Racism and Xenophobia 
punishes “publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the 
crimes” defined by the Nuremberg Charter of 1945.83  For such 
crimes, the Framework Decision makes them “punishable by 
criminal penalties of a maximum of at least between 1 and 3 years 
of imprisonment.” 84   Article 10, section 1 of the Framework 
Decision gave members time until November 28, 2010 to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the provisions of this 
framework.85  While this may seem decisive in expanding the reach 
of denial of Holocaust laws, Framework Decisions do not have 
direct effect on national laws, are only subject to the optional 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and enforcement 
proceedings cannot be taken by the European Commission for any 
failure to transpose a framework decision into domestic law.  
Therefore, when Germany attempted to extradite Fredrick Töben,86 
another convicted Holocaust denier, from the United Kingdom 
                                                                                                               
 81 Holocaust Denier Released from Prison: David Irving Free after 13 Months in Jail, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/holocaust-denier-
released-from-prison-david-irving-free-after-13-months-in-jail-a-455726.html  
[http://perma.cc/AF5Y-7HGH]. 
 82 Dan Bilefsky, EU Adopts Measure Outlawing Holocaust Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/europe/19iht-eu.4.5359640.html 
[http://perma.cc/DPV4-WRYD]. 
 83 Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 
November 2008 on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia 
by Means of Criminal Law, art. 1, § 1(d), 2008 O.J. (L 328) 56 (EU). 
 84 Id. art. 3, § 2, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 57.  
 85 Id. art. 10, § 1, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 58. 
 86 Frederick Töben was detained under a European arrest warrant issued in 2004 by a 
court in Mannheim, Germany, where he is accused of denying the mass murder of Jews by 
the Nazis during the Second World War.  Joshua Rozenberg, Man Accused of Denying the 
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when he was caught passing en route from the United States to 
Dubai, the request failed.87 
Notwithstanding the differing views on how to punish the 
crime of Holocaust denial, it is undeniable that such restrictions on 
speech do take place in Europe.  According to one scholar, 
“Holocaust denial is a form of hate speech because it willfully 
promotes enmity against an identifiable group based on ethnicity 
and religion.”88  More importantly, at least in Europe, the Holocaust 
is considered an uncontestable fact.  The European Court of Justice 
once ruled that, “denying the reality of clearly established historical 
facts, such as the Holocaust . . . does not constitute historical 
research akin to the search of truth.”89  This ahistorical pursuit, the 
court continued, constitutes defamation of Jews and the incitement 
of hatred towards them.90   Because the Holocaust is considered a 
clearly established fact, it is put above other examples of genocide 
throughout the world such as the Armenian genocide, which was 
denied the same legislative protection by the French courts in 
2011.91 Interestingly, even though the United States does not restrict 
speech pertaining to the denial of the Holocaust, and stands by its 
staunch defense of freedom of speech, many American scholars 
agree with restricting denial of Holocaust speech.  While 
theoretically, the denial of Holocaust speech may be allowed due to 
the idea that all citizens should be free to decide what is acceptable 
and unacceptable in the “free marketplace of ideas,” according to 
prominent American legal scholar Stanley Fish, “[w]hen your 
opponent is only pretending to play your game so that he can 
subvert it and pervert it, you have every right—it is an earned 
right—to walk away and refuse him the advantage of 
engagement.”92   Therefore, while the justifications may differ, a 
                                                                                                               
 87 Holocaust Denier Fredrick Toben Freed, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2008), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/3492675/Holocaust-denier-
Frederick-Toben-freed.html [http://perma.cc/8SZ7-PXWM]. 
 88 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Holocaust Denial is a Form of Hate Speech, 2 
AMSTERDAM L. F., no. 1, 2009, at 33, 35, http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/
105/189 [http://perma.cc/BN4Z-4W4P]. 
 89 Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Should Hate Speech Be Protected? Group Defamation, Party 
Bans, Holocaust Denial and the Divide between (France) Europe and the United States. 45 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 552, 613 (2013). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 612. 
 92 Stanley Fish, Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 499, 
512 (2001) (alteration in original). 
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tacit acceptance of laws against Holocaust denial can be found in 
the United States as well.93    
While laws against Holocaust denial are kept in place to 
protect Jewish people from hate speech, the Defamation of 
Religions resolution proposed by Pakistan arguably does the same.  
Defamation of Religion, according to the OIC, constitutes a 
violation of human dignity. 94   Sharing the same roots as the 
resolution, section 298 of the Singapore Penal Code aims to address 
these same issues in restricting the utterance of words that may 
offend religious sentiments.95  Thus, they are all concerned with 
limiting the negative effects of offensive speech. 
This next section will explore whether or not section 298 
effectively achieves these aims.  It will begin with the Amos Yee 
case and conclude with an analysis of the particular Singapore 
social and political conditions that surround section 298 of the 
Singapore’ Penal Code. 
III. AMOS YEE’S CASE 
On March 23, 2015, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding 
Prime Minister, passed away at the age of ninety-one after two years 
of ill health.  His passing, for many Singaporeans, signified the end 
of an era.  Lee oversaw Singapore’s independence from Britain and 
separation from Malaysia.  After the split in 1965, he pledged to 
build a meritocratic, multi-racial nation. 96   In a region still 
recovering from World War II, and serving as a major battle ground 
                                                                                                               
 93 This section is not meant to determine whether laws against Holocaust denial are 
proper.  Instead, it highlights that while the Defamation of Religions resolution is criticized 
for being too specific towards Islam, or defending an ideology or religion instead of a 
person, Holocaust laws can easily be criticized on these bases as well.  Furthermore, while 
it is unacceptable that people of the Jewish faith continue to experience harassment, 
discrimination, and hate crime, it is undeniable that such deplorable conditions are growing 
for Muslims throughout the world.  Lastly, even beyond Islam, if one was to take the 
approach of the American forefathers with regards to blasphemy laws promoting “decency 
and good order,” such laws can be beneficial in promoting order, as opposed to oppressing 
minorities.  See People v. Ruggles, supra note 51, at 294 (blasphemy as a gross violation of 
decency and good order). 
 94 U.N.C.H.R., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/1999/L.40 [http://perma.cc/
A4L3-G5TQ]. 
 95 Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), s 298 (Sing.). 
 96 Singapore’s Founding Father Lee Kuan Yew Dies at 91, BBC (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32012346 [http://perma.cc/PY6Q-GLBR]. 
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for the Cold War, Lee led the first post-independence generation of 
Singapore’s political leaders which transformed the tiny outpost of 
Singapore into one of Asia’s wealthiest and least corrupt countries.  
The New York Times reported upon his death that Lee Kuan Yew 
was “efficient, unsentimental, incorrupt, inventive, forward-looking 
and pragmatic.”97  At the same time, Singaporean academic Cherian 
George described Lee’s leadership as “a unique combination of 
charisma and fear,” with the New York Times in the same article 
mentioning that, “Mr. Lee developed a distinctive Singaporean 
mechanism of political control, filing libel suits that sometimes 
drove his opponents into bankruptcy and doing battle with critics in 
the foreign press.”98  Political opponent J.B. Jeyaretnam has argued 
that, “There’s a climate of fear in Singapore. People are just simply 
afraid. They feel it everywhere. And because they’re afraid they feel 
they can’t do anything.”99  Therefore, while Lee Kuan Yew was 
undoubtedly revered by many for transforming Singapore into the 
cosmopolitan city it is today, at the same time, others feared him, 
and believed his political tactics were oppressive and authoritarian. 
A. Charges Against Amos Yee and the District Court’s Opinion 
On March 27, 2015, four days after Lee Kuan Yew’s death, 
16-year-old Singaporean blogger Amos Yee posted a video called 
“Lee Kuan Yew is finally dead[!]” criticizing former Prime Minister 
Lee and his policies.100  As part of Yee’s eight-minute-long video, 
Yee spent forty seconds criticizing Lee by referring to Christianity, 
drawing an unfavorable analogy between Lee and Jesus, and 
declaring both similar in being “power-hungry” and “malicious” 
and who “deceive others into thinking they are compassionate and 
kind.”101  Yee also posted a blog entry entitled “Lee Kuan Yew 
                                                                                                               
 97 Seth Mydans, Lee Kuan Yew, Founding Father and First Premier of Singapore, 
Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/world/asia/
lee-kuan-yew-founding-father-and-first-premier-of-singapore-dies-at-91.html [http://perma.
cc/2BKS-38ZP]. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Pub. Prosecutor v. Amos Yee Pang Sang, [2015] SGDC 215 ¶ 27 (Sing.). 
 101 Id. ¶ 32; Kirsten Han, Singapore Police Arrest 17-Year-Old Over Critical Lee 
Kuan Yew Video, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
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[2015] SGDC 215. 
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buttfucking Margaret Thatcher” with an image depicting Lee and 
Thatcher’s photos superimposed on a stick-figure drawing of two 
characters in a sexual position.102  Within hours, members of the 
public filed dozens of police reports, and two days after the posting, 
Yee’s home was raided and he was arrested.103  Yee was charged 
under section 292(1)(a) of the Penal Code regarding the 
transmission of obscene drawings, and under section 298 for 
deliberately intending to wound religious feelings.  A third charge 
under chapter 256A, the Protection from Harassment Act, was also 
filed, but this charge was ultimately dropped. 104   District Court 
Judge Jasvender Kaur heard the case from May 7–8, 2015.105  She 
issued her final judgment on July 28, 2015.106 
Section 292(1)(a) of the Singapore Penal Code is entitled, 
“Sale of Obscene Books, etc.”   The language of the statute is as 
follows: 
292 (1).  Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, 
transmits by electronic means, publicly exhibits 
or in any manner puts into circulation, or for 
purposes of sale, hire, distribution, transmission, 
public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces, 
or has in his possession any obscene book, 
pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, 
representation or figure, or any other obscene 
object whatsoever;107 
With regards to this charge, in defining “obscene,” the court 
focused on the persons likely to view the blog, and whether the 
content had a tendency to deprave and corrupt.  Judge Kaur decided 
that because Yee was a teenager, the likely readers of the blog were 
teenagers themselves.108  As such, the picture of Lee Kuan Yew and 
Margaret Thatcher “buttfucking” could “excite teenagers to try out 
different sexual positions [and engage in] deviant sexual activity i.e., 
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anal intercourse.”109  On this basis she found that the image had a 
tendency to deprave and corrupt, and therefore found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Yee was guilty of violating 292(1)(a).110 
Section 298 of the Singapore Penal Code is entitled 
“Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious 
or racial feelings of any person.”  In particular, the law states, 
298.  Whoever, with deliberate intention of 
wounding the religious or racial feelings of any 
person, utters any word or makes any sound in the 
hearing of that person, or makes any gesture in the 
sight of that person, or places any object in the sight 
of that person, or causes any matter however 
represented to be seen or heard by that person, shall 
be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.111  
In addressing this charge, the court focused on a portion of 
the video in which Yee compared Lee Kuan Yew to Jesus.  In his 
video, Yee stated, 
Seeing what Lee Kuan Yew has done, I am sure 
many individuals who have done similar things come 
to mind.  But I’m going to compare him to someone 
that people really haven’t mentioned before – Jesus.  
And the aptness of that analogy is heightened seeing 
how Christians really seem to be a big fan of him.  
They are both power hungry and malicious, but 
deceive others into thinking that they are 
compassionate and kind.  Their impact and legacy 
will ultimately not last as more and more people find 
out that they are full of bull.  And Lee Kuan Yew’s 
followers are completely delusional and ignorant and 
have absolutely no sound logic or knowledge about 
him that is grounded in reality, which Lee Kuan Yew 
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easily manipulates, similar to Christian knowledge of 
the Bible and the work of a multitude of priests.112  
In her analysis, Judge Kaur focused on three aspects of the 
law as applied to Yee’s comments: 1) the meaning of “any person,” 
2) whether Yee’s actions wounded the feelings of Christians, and 3) 
whether Yee’s actions were deliberate. 113   With regards to the 
meaning of “any person,” Yee argued that the statute was “only 
meant to criminalise words, gestures or representations that are 
directed at a person and not at the entire religious community.”114  
Judge Kaur rejected this argument referring to section 2 of 
Singapore’s Interpretation Act which states that “words in the 
singular include the plural and words and expressions in the plural 
include the singular.” 115   Concerning whether Yee’s actions 
wounded the feelings of Christians, she found that words such as 
“power hungry,” “malicious,” “deceptive,” “full of bull,” and Yee’s 
representations that Jesus’ legacy will not last, that Christians have 
no knowledge of the bible, and that Christians are being 
manipulated by a multitude of priests, are clearly derogatory and 
offensive to Christians.116  She emphasized the fact that Yee knew 
that some of the comments he was making would be offensive to 
Christians, and that some of the people who had left negative 
comments about the video were Christians.117  On this point, Judge 
Kaur found that the section did not actually require any proof that 
the feelings of Christians were wounded, only that Yee deliberately 
intended to wound the religious feelings of a person.118 
On determining whether there was deliberate intention, the 
defense argued that there was no “real or dominant” intention to 
wound the religious feelings of Christians.119  Yee argued that the 
video was meant to be a criticism of Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy, and 
not a video aimed at harming the religious feelings of Christians.120  
This, the defense added, is evidenced in the fact that the title of the 
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video is “Lee Kuan Yew is finally dead” and that Yee prefaced his 
comments on Christianity with, “Seeing what Lee Kuan Yew has 
done, I am sure that many individuals who have done similar things 
have come to mind.”121  Lastly, in his closing statement, Yee stated 
that as he was doing research for his video, he began to see a lot of 
similarities between Lee Kuan Yew and Jesus and thought that it 
was a “rather interesting and unique analogy.”122  Judge Kaur found 
that the motive of using Jesus as an analogy was irrelevant since 
Yee was still denigrating Jesus, and secondly, she found that Yee 
was “fully aware” that the comparison was offensive.123  She added 
that Yee had looked up provisions of the Sedition Act, a law that 
prosecutes seditious speech and in the past had also been used to 
prosecute acts that offended religious sentiments that had the 
potential to cause public disorder. 124   Judge Kaur dismissed the 
argument that people had the ability to ignore Yee’s comments, and 
the defense’s argument that people stumbling across his blog was 
akin to overhearing a conversation not meant for them.125  Having 
found that all of the elements of section 298 were satisfied, the court 
found Yee guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.126 
Upon sentencing, the court acknowledged that Yee had 
already spent eighteen days in Singapore’s Changi Prison. 127  
Having found that the elements of both charges were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, Yee was convicted of both charges and required 
to spend three weeks in Changi Prison for the section 298 charge, 
and one week in Changi Prison for the section 292(1)(a) charge.128   
She added that as both offenses were distinct, she ordered both 
sentences to be run consecutively for a total of four weeks.129 
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B. On Appeal at the High Court 
On appeal, the defense argued that the District Court’s ruling 
was unsafe, and that the Court of Appeal has previously held that 
one’s freedom of speech, enshrined in article 14 of the Constitution, 
was a fundamental right.130  Yee’s counsel argued that: 
”[a]lthough the speech and means with which Amos 
chose to express his critique of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew 
may be shocking and timed inappropriately, the 
question before the court today is this: Are there 
competing public interests which are so greatly 
undermined, that the constitutional right to freedom 
of speech must yield?”131 
To make his case, Yee’s counsel added that the case was 
larger than Yee, and that the court’s decision has far reaching 
implications on the curtailment of free speech and rigorous 
debate.132  He added that in an age of renewed interest in politics 
and an emerging sense of ownership amongst Singaporeans over 
their political processes, people should not be afraid of criticizing 
their leaders.133 
Yee’s counsel first focused on the obscenity charge, arguing 
that the High Court wanted to adopt the strict approach used by the 
District Court in determining who the “likely viewers” covered 
under the obscenity definition, and what the standard should be 
when determining whether the words or actions would “deprave and 
corrupt.”134  On the section 298 charge, Yee argued “the court must 
choose how much weight to accord to the context and the theme 
behind the relevant words, as well as how cogent the evidence must 
be in determining whether a defendant deliberately intended to 
wound the religious feelings of another.”135  Yee rested both his 
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arguments on two previously decided cases of the Court of Appeal.  
The first was Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong.136  In 
this case, Yee argued that the Court of Appeal found that one’s 
freedom of speech is a “right based on a constitutional or higher 
legal order of foundation.”137  Yee noted that in Review Publishing 
Co. Ltd., the Court of Appeal even went so far as to say that “the 
right of free speech set out in art. 14(1)(a) is of a higher legal order 
than the Convention right of free speech in England as the 
Singapore Constitution is expressly declared (in art. 4) to be the 
supreme law of the land.”138 
Next, Yee referred to the recent case, Attorney-General v. 
Au Wai Pang.139  Yee stated that in this case the High Court rejected 
the “inherent tendency” test in favor of the higher threshold of the 
“real risk” test.140  The High Court in Au Wai Pang stated that, 
“there is significant tension between freedom of speech and the 
administration of justice because of the public interest in protecting 
both principles.”141  Yee cited to the section of the opinion in which 
the High Court stated, “[t]he issue, in the final analysis is one of 
balance: just as the law relating to contempt of court ought not to 
unduly infringe the right of freedom of speech, by the same token, 
that right is not an absolute right, for its untrammeled abuse would 
be a negation of the right itself.”142 
In attempting to establish a standard in achieving this 
balance, the Court of Appeal relied on the article “A ‘Real Risk’ of 
Undermining Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice” 
by Associate Professor David Tan from the National University of 
Singapore School of Law.143  In particular, the Court of Appeal held, 
“I agree with Mr. Tan that the combination of the ‘“real risk’ test 
and the placing of the legal burden on the Prosecution ‘calibrates’ 
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appropriately the tension between freedom of speech and the public 
interest in protecting public confidence in the administration of 
justice.”144  The Court of Appeal went on to clarify, “the AG must 
prove the absence of fair criticism within the ambit of liability for 
scandalising contempt.  This ensures that the alleged contemnor 
(“the defendant”) is not disadvantaged.”145 
In his concluding paragraphs, Yee’s counsel highlighted the 
fact that Yee had left the Catholic faith to adopt “logic and 
reasoning” as his religion. 146   He added that Yee “[was] not a 
peddler of obscenity, nor [did] he have any reason to insult 
Christians.”147  Yee’s actions, therefore, according to his counsel, 
are “exactly those sought to be protected by the right to free 
speech.”148  Yee was “expressing his views on matters of public 
interest to promote criticism and for the betterment of the 
country.”149  Yee’s counsel submitted that “the balance must tilt 
towards the presumptive right and Constitutional guarantee of free 
speech, such that ‘likely viewers’ in the section 292 charge should 
not be interpreted widely and loosely, and a finding of a tendency to 
‘deprave and corrupt’ must be based on cogent reasoning and 
evidence.”150  He added that, regarding the section 298 charge, “the 
court must closely scrutinize the evidence and context of the words 
before it arrives at a finding that Amos’s purpose was to insult 
Christians.”151  Yee reiterated that he thought the District Court’s 
findings were unsafe vis-à-vis article 14 of the Singapore 
Constitution.152 
After rejecting many of Yee’s counsel’s arguments at oral 
arguments, the High Court issued an oral opinion dismissing Yee’s 
appeal.  Through the prosecutor’s office, a written summary of the 
court’s opinion was made available.  In the summary, Justice Tay 
Yong Kwang stated, “I see no reason to disagree with the [District 
Judge] in most of her findings except for the qualifications that 
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follow . . . ”153  In the summary, the High Court supplemented Judge 
Kaur’s analysis by adding, “depicting 2 naked bodies in that overtly 
sexual position, with or without the attendant words, must be 
obscene by the standards of any right-thinking society.”154  On the 
section 298 charge, Justice Tay stated, “[Mr Yee] . . . used 
vulgarities and insults to deliberatively provoke the reader and to 
draw him out.” 155   The court continued, “[h]is statement to the 
police showed that he was ‘fully aware that this comparison was 
bound to promote ill-will amongst the Christian population,’” and 
asked, “how is ill-will different from wounding somebody’s 
feelings?”156  Addressing Yee’s counsel’s argument that Yee had 
left the Catholic Church to adopt logic and reasoning as his religion, 
Justice Tay saw this as a possible “emotional catalyst” that perhaps 
motivated Yee’s choice of words.157  Furthermore, he added that his 
words were also directed at non-Christians “so long as they hit the 
smaller group’s feelings as well.”158  Justice Tay stated that “[t]hree 
carefully crafted sentences about a subject can deliver as much 
venom as 30 pages of text about another subject, especially when 
the subjects are then linked by analogy and said to be similar.”159 
In addressing the freedom of speech argument, Justice Tay 
went on to say, 
All this was done in the noble disguise of freedom of 
speech and a purported desire to generate genuine 
discussions and debate. His deliberate use of 
vulgarities and crude language and obscene depiction 
to provoke reaction seems like someone throwing 
stones at the windows of a neighbour’s flat to force 
the neighbour to notice him, come out to quarrel or 
even to fight.  This does not sound like freedom of 
speech at all. It is a licence to hate, to humiliate 
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others and to totally disregard their feelings or beliefs 
by using words to inflict unseen wounds.160 
On these grounds, Justice Tay dismissed Yee’s appeal.161  
He also affirmed the District Court’s sentence of four weeks’ 
imprisonment over both the prosecution’s and defense’s request for 
one day of confinement in Changi Prison for each of the two 
charges.162  
While this may seem like a terse and somewhat prudish 
interpretation of the law, it must be remembered that the law itself is 
not Singaporean.  It stems from a long line of history tracing back to 
the Indian Penal Code and the British colonial concern that religious 
tensions would erupt into violence.  Furthermore, the interpretation 
of the law also reflects the legislative intent found in recent 
revisions to the law that were meant to protect Singaporeans from 
the rise of religiously insensitive actions and remarks in Singapore 
and Europe.   The next section will review the history of the law 
from its inception to today. 
C. History of the Law 
Section 298 of the Singapore Penal Code first found its way 
to Singapore through the Indian Penal Code of 1860, which was 
enacted in the Straits Colonies in 1871.163  The text of section 298 
of the 1860 Indian Penal Code was as follows: 
298. Whoever with the deliberate intention of 
wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters 
any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that 
person, or makes any gesture in the sight of that 
person, or placed any object in the sight of that 
person, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
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either description for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with fine, or with both.164 
In 1862, when the Indian Penal Code first came into 
operation, it included four sections that protected religious freedom 
in the British colony.  These sections were 295 (defiling a place of 
worship), 296 (disturbing a religious assembly), 297 (trespassing on 
burial places), and 298 (uttering words with deliberate intent to 
wound religious feelings).165  The Law Commissioners who drafted 
the laws stated that in framing the clause they had two objects in 
mind. 166  The first was to allow fair latitude to religious discussion, 
and the second was to, at the same time, prevent intentional insults 
to the sacred views of others.167  The explanatory section to the law 
added, “such insults . . . seldom have any effect other than to fix 
those opinions deeper and to give a character of peculiar ferocity to 
the theological dissention. Instead of eliciting truth, they only 
inflame fanaticism.”168 
Singapore’s section 298 shares very similar language to the 
original Indian Penal Code of 1860.  Section 298 of the Singapore 
Penal Code currently states, 
Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to 
wound the religious or racial feelings of any 
person 
298.  Whoever, with deliberate intention of 
wounding the religious or racial feelings of any 
person, utters any word or makes any sound in the 
hearing of that person, or makes any gesture in the 
sight of that person, or places any object in the sight 
of that person, or causes any matter however 
represented to be seen or heard by that person, shall 
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be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.169  
The main difference between the 1860 Indian Penal Code 
version and the current Singapore version was the addition of the 
words “or racial” and “or causes any matter however represented to 
be seen or heard by that person.” 170   It also increases the 
imprisonment term from one year to three years.171  Some of these 
changes came about in 2007 in response to the Jyllands-Posten 
Muhammad cartoons controversy.  Revising the law to include 
section 298A, Parliament added the following, 
Promoting enmity between different groups on 
grounds of religion or race and doing acts 
prejudicial to maintenance of harmony 
298A.  Whoever — 
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or 
by visible representations or otherwise, knowingly 
promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of 
religion or race, disharmony or feelings of enmity, 
hatred or ill-will between different religious or racial 
groups; or 
(b)  commits any act which he knows is prejudicial to 
the maintenance of harmony between different 
religious or racial groups and which disturbs or is 
likely to disturb the public tranquility, 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with 
both.172 
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Most members of Parliament agreed with the enhancement 
of the law and in fact argued that the law did not go far enough.  
According to one member of Parliament, 
[L]earning from the recent Danish cartoon 
controversy, I would like to ask the Senior Minister 
of State whether these sections go far enough to 
address cases where the author draws cartoons or 
paints pictures innocently, ignorantly or under the 
guise of freedom of expression without deliberate 
intention to provoke nor knowledge that it will lead 
to disharmony.173 
Another member of Parliament brought up Singapore’s 
history with racial problems stating, “Any insensitive or 
inconsiderate action by a small minority can easily result in racial 
riots as Singapore had experienced in the Maria Hertogh riots and in 
the 1969 racial riots.”174 
These changes also came on the heels of several high profile 
cases in Singapore in which bloggers were caught posting 
insensitive materials regarding religion in 2005.  In Public 
Prosecutor v. Koh Song Huat Benjamin, Koh was accused of 
posting disparaging comments about Malays and Islam on an 
internet forum for dog lovers in a discussion about whether taxis 
should refuse to carry uncaged pets out of consideration for 
Muslims in 2005.175 Nicholas Lim Yew was concurrently charged 
and convicted for advocating the desecration of Islam’s holy site of 
Mecca. 176   While Koh was sentenced to serve one month’s 
imprisonment, Lim was sentenced to a nominal one-day 
imprisonment and the maximum fine of $5000 in default of one 
month’s imprisonment.177  A third blogger, a seventeen-year old 
Chinese male was sentenced to twenty-four months of supervised 
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probation under the condition that he undergo psychological 
evaluation and follow-up to address the death of his brother, 178 
attend counseling sessions to correct his misguided dislike of 
Malays, post a $10,000 bond to ensure good behavior, and perform 
180 hours of community service in a Malay welfare home.179  The 
third blogger pled guilty to making inflammatory comments about 
Malays and Muslims.180 
All three cases were charged under the Sedition Act.  The 
Sedition Act in Singapore prohibits seditious acts and speech, and 
the printing, publication, sale, distribution, reproduction and 
importation of seditious publications.181  What is notable about the 
act is that in addition to punishing actions that can undermine the 
administration of government, the Act also criminalizes actions 
which promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between different 
races or classes of the population.  In particular, the Act states: 
3(1)  A seditious tendency is a tendency — 
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite 
disaffection against the Government; 
(b) to excite the citizens of Singapore or the 
residents in Singapore to attempt to procure in 
Singapore, the alteration, otherwise than by lawful 
means, of any matter as by law established; 
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite 
disaffection against the administration of justice in 
Singapore; 
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(d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the 
citizens of Singapore or the residents in Singapore; 
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility 
between different races or classes of the population 
of Singapore.182 
If found guilty of committing a seditious tendency, a first 
offence under the act may lead to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or both.183  For 
subsequent offences, a defendant can be sentenced to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years.184  The three bloggers were the 
first people to be charged under the Sedition Act since 1966.185 
Because the charge of “sedition” seemed disproportionate to 
the act of posting hostile and insensitive remarks, some members of 
Parliament believed that amending section 298 of the Penal Code 
would provide the government with more flexibility to go after such 
offenses.  In particular, one member of Parliament noted, “The cases 
of the racist bloggers, Benjamin Koh and Nicholas Lim, who were 
charged and convicted under the Sedition Act raised the question 
whether there was a need to prosecute the offenders under such a 
high signature Act.”186  Other members of Parliament were afraid 
that the Sedition Act was too narrow and that section 298 gave 
prosecutors more discretion to charge those who commit offensive 
acts through the internet and social media.  In particular, one 
member of Parliament remarked, “these changes make such 
offences have clearer definitions and it does not solely rely on the 
Sedition Act that may have limited scope.” 187   Moreover, a 
conviction under section 298 could lead to a lower penalty of a 
maximum imprisonment of three years.  On these bases, section 298 
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of the Penal Code was amended by an act of Parliament in 2007, 
and was first commenced on February 1, 2008.188 
Therefore, section 298 was a British import that was 
enhanced by events taking place in Europe and the advent of 
technology in Singapore.  In addition to section 298 and the 
Sedition Act, Singapore also has the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act of 1992. 189   These laws provide a comprehensive 
legal infrastructure that restricts freedom of speech particularly in 
respect to religion.  As was demonstrated in the earlier section, 
section 298 can trace its roots to circumstances and contexts that go 
as far back as the Indian Penal Code of 1871.  Yet laws cannot be 
sustained without acceptance in the society in which they are 
located.  This next section will review the particular socio-historical 
conditions in Singapore that continue to keep section 298 in place. 
IV. SINGAPORE CONTEXT 
Although section 298, in conjunction with the Sedition Act, 
and other laws that restrict freedom of speech can seem highly 
oppressive, these laws emerged within, and are supported by, a 
larger social and historical context. 190   Since its inception, 
Singapore’s heavy handed policies have constantly received 
criticism from international human rights groups and actors for the 
lack of human and civil rights protections—in particular, 
Singapore’s death penalty is condemned, its use of caning 
constantly under fire, and treatment of foreign workers and political 
dissidents heavily scrutinized. 191   Yee’s case was no exception.  
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International human rights organizations including the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and 
Freedom House, released statements denouncing Amos Yee’s 
prosecution and conviction. 192   The prosecution of Yee was 
criticized as violating the right to free speech.193 Moreover, Yee’s 
age complicated the matter further, and Singapore was criticized for 
contravening its obligations as a signatory of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).194 
Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director of the Human Rights 
Watch commented, “[t]he” dismal state of Singapore’s respect for 
free expression can be seen in the decision to impose the criminal 
justice system on outspoken 16-year-olds.”195  A statement by the 
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
said, “the criminal sanctions considered in this case seem 
disproportionate and inappropriate in terms of the international 
protections for freedom of expression.”196  In addition, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression said, “the mere fact 
that a form of expression was considered to be insulting to a public 
figure was not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties,” 
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adding that Yee’s conviction would have a “deterrent effect on 
others in Singapore who criticized public figures or the 
Government.”197  The U.N. OHCHR urged the government to “give 
special consideration to his juvenile status and ensure his treatment 
is consistent with the best interests of the child, the principle that 
lies at the heart of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” 
adding that the “OHCHR also hopes that the judiciary will exercise 
its authority in the protection of human rights including the rights of 
the child.” 198  When asked in an interview with Time magazine 
about Yee’s case, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 
who is Lee Kuan Yew’s son, justified the punishment of Yee by 
referring to the need to maintain religious harmony.199 
While these criticisms are useful in highlighting potential 
pitfalls and shortcomings with Singapore’s laws, many of these 
criticisms do not take into account that the laws Yee was prosecuted 
under, such as section 298, reflect Singapore’s particular historical 
and social conditions.  This section will explore the conditions that 
surround section 298 to provide a richer understanding of why this 
law exists.  It will first discuss the religious and racial history of 
Singapore, then proceed to discuss how in a post-9/11 Singapore, 
lawmakers have ramped up these laws not only to prevent terrorism, 
but also to protect its Muslim minority.  This section will then 
conclude with a discussion on whether restricting religious speech is 
the best approach to maintaining religious harmony, as well as an 
examination of some of the difficulties in applying the law. 
A. Multiculturalism and Religious/Racial Harmony in 
Singapore 
One of the main reasons behind retaining and enhancing 
section 298 of Singapore’s Penal Code is to protect the religious and 
ethnic harmony in a nation that embodies significant diversity.  The 
ethnic composition of Singapore consists of a Chinese majority 
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group (74.1%) and significant minority groups of ethnic Malays 
(13.4%) and Indians (9.2%), 200  with Eurasians and other ethnic 
groups making up the rest.  The Pew Research Centre’s Religious 
Diversity Index ranked Singapore as the most religiously diverse 
country in the world, 201  being home to adherents of religions 
including Buddhism (33.3%), Christianity (18.3%), Islam (14.7%), 
Taoism (10.9%), and Hinduism (5.1%), among others.202  Ethnicity 
and religious affiliation are closely related,203 with Chinese making 
up the majority of Buddhists and Taoists, Malays making up the 
majority of Muslims, and Indians making up the majority of Hindus 
in Singapore.204 
Historically, the tense relations between racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups served as the basis for violent uprisings.  The Maria 
Hertogh riots, for instance, are a case in point and continue to weigh 
heavily on the minds of lawmakers as seen in the debates on section 
298.  The riots took place from December 11–13, 1950,205 with 
clashes between Muslims and Christians.206  Maria Hertogh was a 
girl born in 1937 to Dutch-Eurasian parents residing in Java, who 
baptized her as a Catholic.207  Her parents were imprisoned during 
the Second World War by the Japanese, and Maria was taken in by 
a Muslim family and raised as a Muslim.208  After the war,209 over 
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seven years later,210 her birth parents successfully sought to reclaim 
Maria through a court order obtained by the Dutch consul in 
Singapore. 211   The order was reversed, however, due to 
technicalities, and Maria returned to her foster parents and married a 
Muslim man.212  The Court annulled Maria’s marriage, stating that 
it was legal under Muslim law, but not under Dutch and British 
law.213  The Court also placed Maria in a Catholic convent during 
the trial,214 and eventually awarded custody to her birth parents.215  
Tensions between Muslims and Christians were aggravated by the 
Court’s actions and the sensationalistic media coverage of the 
case.216  A protest by Muslims outside the courtroom sparked a 
nationwide riot, which ended after two days, with eighteen people 
dead and 173 wounded. 217 
Furthermore, the year before Singapore’s independence, in 
1964, ethnic tensions between the Malays and the Chinese which 
had been building up due to communal politics218 erupted into two 
series of riots, eventually contributing to the separation of Singapore 
from Malaysia.219  The first series of riots, on the 21st of July during 
a procession celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, killed 
twenty-two people and wounded 454 others over five days of 
rioting.220  The second series of riots broke out a month later, killing 
twelve and wounding 109 people.221  Thus, the likelihood of ethno-
religious violence was critical in the minds of Singapore’s political 
leaders when Singapore gained independence in 1965. 
As a result of these circumstances, the state remains secular 
and religiously neutral, and attempts to manage these diverse groups 
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of people in many ways.222  While race and religion are both key 
issues in Singapore, race is more salient and used as an organizing 
principle by the government.223  And on the whole, the Singapore 
government has been largely successful in preserving the peace 
between these disparate groups for the last fifty years.  As the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance commented in 
2010, “Considering that violent communal riots occurred just a few 
decades ago . . . the peaceful coexistence of the diverse 
communities is a remarkable achievement in itself.”224 
According to the official narrative, and popular 
understanding, because of the diversity of Singapore’s population, 
and incidents of ethno-religious riots in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
harmony between the different ethnic and religious groups is fragile 
and must be fiercely protected as any racial or religious strife could 
have the potential to tear Singapore apart. 225  Since Singapore’s 
independence,226 which was marked by turbulence and ethnic and 
religious divisions, 227  the government has emphasized racial and 
religious harmony, and taken great steps to prevent ethno-religious 
conflict, a strategy which has been described as “pro-active, pre-
emptive and interventionist.”228 This was driven by a need to unite a 
diverse and divided young nation, and to maintain social order in 
order to attract foreign investment in a “resource-scarce 
economy.”229   Even until today, with no ethno-religious conflict 
since 1969, the government continues to emphasize the need for 
maintaining racial and religious harmony for the nation’s survival. 
The state promotes racial and religious harmony through 
three broad methods—the principle of multiculturalism, laws, and 
policies. 230   Multiculturalism, more commonly referred to in 
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Singapore as a multiracial and multi-religious system, refers to a 
policy where all ethnic groups and religions have the right to retain 
their culture231 and receive equal treatment and consideration by the 
state. 232   The Singapore constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion 233  and the state’s official policy is to treat all religions 
equally.  For instance, religious festivals of the major religions are 
declared public holidays, including Christmas, Hari Raya, Vesak 
Day, Good Friday and Diwali.234  Diversity is embraced, mutual 
understanding of other religions is encouraged,235 and Singaporeans 
of all ethnicities and religions are forced to interact in their 
communities, schools, work, and everyday life.236  In addition, the 
state has policies in place to protect minorities and to ensure 
minority representation and equal treatment.237 
In addition to section 298, the Sedition Act, and the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1992 serve to create a 
strong legal infrastructure to prosecute those who attempt to disrupt 
the delicate racial and religious stability.238  In addition, the state 
actively censors content that may potentially be offensive to religion, 
including preventing the film The Last Temptation of Christ from 
being screened, banning Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic 
Verses, 239  and most recently in 2016, prohibiting pop singer 
Madonna from performing songs which contain religiously sensitive 
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content such as “Holy Water” during her concert in Singapore.240  
Limits on free speech in Singapore are not only enshrined legally 
but also unofficially, in the form of “OB Markers,” a golfing term 
referring to out-of-bounds markers used by the government to 
delineate the boundaries for acceptable public discussion.  Taboo 
topics include race and religion.241 
Furthermore, education is a key strategy in maintaining 
peaceful relations between the different religious and ethnic 
communities.  Government-run schools, which the majority of 
Singaporeans attend, emphasize racial and religious harmony.  As 
part of the “National Education” syllabus, students learn about the 
fragility of the harmony in Singapore and are reminded to be on 
their guard against threats against this harmony. 242   Since 1997, 
Racial Harmony Day has been observed on the 21st of July every 
year in schools to commemorate the riots that began on 21st July 
1964 and to emphasize the importance of maintaining racial and 
religious peace. 243   The “Singapore Pledge,” which students at 
government schools recite every day during school assemblies, 
contains the phrase “We, the citizens of Singapore, pledge ourselves 
as one united people, regardless of race, language or 
religion. . . .”244  Ministers and members of Parliament frequently 
make statements on the importance of maintaining racial and 
religious amicability, especially as the threat of terrorism and 
Islamophobia has increased in recent years.245 
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In addition, in response to the terrorist threat highlighted by 
the capture of members of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network in 
Singapore in 2001 and 2002, 246  the government created a 
Declaration of Religious Harmony to be declared every year in 
honor of the 1964 racial riots,247 as well as the Inter-Racial and 
Religious Confidence Circles (IRCC) in an effort to encourage 
interreligious dialogue. 248   There are also other organizations to 
promote religious harmony, such as the Inter-Religious 
Organization 249  and the Presidential Council for Religious 
Harmony.250  Thus, in Singapore, section 298 does not stand alone 
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but is part of a larger framework of laws and policies to maintain 
peace between different racial and religious groups in Singapore. 
Therefore, due to Singapore’s experiences with ethno-
religious riots, the political leaders of post-independent Singapore 
are wary of how ethnic and religious sentiments “could easily be 
exploited to cause inter-communal conflicts” in multicultural 
Singapore. 251   Section 298 is but one law among many to help 
Singapore avoid a recurrence of ethno-religious violence. 
B. Singapore after September 11, 2001 
In the post-9/11 climate, the increased threat of terrorism 
and the rise in Islamophobia have changed the global landscape.252 
Singapore is exceptionally at risk of both, being situated in 
Southeast Asia, a region with terrorist activity, 253  and having a 
diverse population including a significant Muslim population that 
may become the target of Islamophobia.  Thus, the Singapore 
government recognizes that post-9/11, there are not one but two 
concerns.  The first concern, the terrorist threat, has been addressed 
by many countries through counter-terrorism military strategies.  
However, few have addressed the second concern: maintaining 
religious harmony and good relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims, which may be further threatened by religiously offensive 
speech and Islamophobia.254 
In Singapore, in addition to counter-terrorism policies, the 
government has responded to the risk of strained racial relations and 
social divisions by ramping up efforts to maintain religious harmony, 
and increasing vigilance on speech that may threaten it.  These 
efforts include legal strategies, for instance, the addition of section 
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298(a) as part of the response to the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad 
cartoons controversy.  In the case of Public Prosecutor v. Koh Song 
Huat Benjamin, the Court considered the “heightened Islamic 
sensitivities in the post 9-11 security climate,” alongside “the 
specific historical and present context of Singapore’s diverse 
society,” thus sentencing Koh with the objective of deterrence.255  In 
addition, political leaders continually urge Singaporeans to guard 
against religiously insensitive speech and to maintain peaceful 
relations between religions.  After members of Jemaah Islamiyah 
were arrested in 2001 and 2002 for planning terrorist attacks in 
Singapore, the government “called on Singaporeans not to place the 
blame on the Muslim community or Islam,” urging Singaporeans to 
“stay united and maintain social harmony.”256  More recently, in 
January 2016, after twenty-seven Bangladeshi migrant workers 
were arrested in Singapore for radicalization and planning terrorist 
attacks,257 the government cautioned Singaporeans not to react to 
the news by criticizing Islam or Muslims, as it would “tear our 
society apart.”258 
Furthermore, preventing relations between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Singapore from deteriorating is also crucial to 
counter-terrorism efforts,259 with the government’s stance being that 
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“if Singaporeans of all races and religions build for themselves a 
more cohesive and tolerant society, groups such as JI (Jemaah 
Islamiyah) would find it much harder to establish a foothold in 
Singapore.” 260   Thus, religiously insensitive speech and other 
actions that may worsen relations between the diverse communities 
in Singapore would be counterproductive to the fight against 
terrorism.  In this light, laws like section 298 may in fact also 
function as part of the fight against terrorism and its effects on 
society.  Hence, Singapore has two reasons to limit religiously 
insensitive speech in the post 9/11 climate.  The first is to maintain 
the peace between Muslims and non-Muslims in a religiously 
diverse country, especially guarding against the rise of 
Islamophobia and its threat to religious harmony and social order.  
The second reason is to guard against alienation, radicalization, and 
the exploitation of religious differences by terror elements, which 
would render Singapore more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.261 
Lastly, in societies like Singapore, where there is racial and 
religious diversity but with a significant majority group, limits on 
certain kinds of speech that may target minorities may be justified, 
in order to protect minorities from oppressive speech.  In particular, 
section 298 can and has been used to protect Muslim minorities 
from oppressive and hateful speech.262  In 2010, Andrew Kiong, a 
Chinese Singaporean, deliberately targeted Muslims by placing 
cards insulting Islam on the windshields of their cars, parked in a 
condominium car park.263  He was convicted under section 298 and 
sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment.  In Public Prosecutor v. 
Koh Song Huat Benjamin, another Chinese Singaporean insulted 
Malays and Islam. 264   Although he was prosecuted under the 
Sedition Act, changes to the law in 2007 would have allowed him to 
be prosecuted under section 298.  Given that the Chinese are the 
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ethnic majority in Singapore and that the Malay-Muslims are an 
ethnic minority, the presence of section 298 may help to protect 
Malay-Muslims and other ethnic minorities from the harmful speech 
of the majority. 
C. Questioning “Racial Harmony” and Problems with 
Applying Section 298 
While section 298 preserves religious harmony, and aims to 
fight off the marginalization and potential radicalization of 
Singapore’s minority communities, it is undeniable that this 
approach may not be right for all nations, and furthermore, even in 
nations where the law works, there can still be negative 
consequences, as well as problems with its application.  One 
problem with restrictions on speech that offends religious 
sentiments is that there is the danger of restricting other types of 
speech as well.  First, restrictions on speech that may cause racial or 
religious offence, whether legal or normative, may have a chilling 
effect on all speech that concerns race or religion.  For instance, 
restrictions on speech relating to race and religion in Singapore can 
limit the opportunities for ethnic minorities “who may have 
legitimate grievances in a Chinese-dominated society” to voice their 
concerns publicly.265  Speaking up about discrimination could easily 
be considred to be “prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony,” 
which is prohibited under section 298A.266  Thus, such limits on 
speech may be counterproductive to the goal of protecting 
minorities if it restricts them from speaking up about discrimination. 
In addition, the limits on racially and religiously sensitive 
speech in Singapore may discourage meaningful discussions about 
race and religion, and thus be counterproductive to maintaining 
racial and religious harmony. Law professor Jaclyn Neo argues, 
“repressing open communication may lead to suspicion, resentment 
and division, thereby impeding true integration and the creation of a 
true community.”267  Similarly, Mathews and bin Khidzer argue that 
discussions about sensitive issues are needed “to allow the public to 
confront racial and religious insensitivities and develop the 
appropriate mechanisms to deal with them based on the spirit of 
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respect and tolerance,” which would build “a more resilient 
population.”268 
Furthermore, while early Singapore may have needed such 
laws, contemporary Singapore, with decades of peaceful 
coexistence between different ethnic and religious groups, might 
now be mature enough and ready to maintain harmony without such 
restrictions.  For instance, in recent years, when there were cases of 
discriminatory speech, Chinese Singaporeans have publicly come 
out in defense of minority Singaporeans.269  Thus, some argue that 
Singaporean society is ready to do away with this law, and that such 
restrictions on the constitutional right to free speech are no longer 
justified on the grounds of maintaining racial and religious harmony.  
In 2010, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for racism echoed these 
concerns about the restrictions on free speech, particularly with 
regard to ethnicity.  He argued that these restrictions on racially-
sensitive speech are no longer justified as Singapore “had evolved 
substantially from the days of the violent confrontations 45 years 
ago.” 270   In particular, he expressed concern about “legislative 
provisions which deal with the promotion of feelings of ‘enmity,’ 
‘ill-will,’ or ‘hostility’ between members of the different ethnic 
groups in Singapore.” 271   The Special Rapporteur’s comments 
highlight the problems with a law like section 298 that restricts both 
racially and religiously sensitive speech.  Although Mr. Muigai, as 
the Special Rapporteur for Racism, only referred to restrictions on 
free speech with regard to ethnicity, the concerns he highlighted 
may reasonably be applied to religion as well.  Thus, such 
restrictions may in fact run counter to promoting a meaningful and 
more deeply-rooted racial and religious harmony and indeed even 
contribute to inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions. 
The success of the Singaporean government’s strategies to 
maintain racial and religious harmony has also been questioned by 
scholars.  Mathews and bin Khidzer point out that “the Singapore 
brand of harmony has encountered its fair share of problems,”272 
while Barr argues that Singapore’s “harmony” has resulted in 
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conformity and timidity among the population.273  Tong suggests 
that this harmony is only present on the surface, and that “there may 
be underlying ethnic and religious tensions” which may lead to 
conflict if one group perceives discrimination.274  Sociologist Chua 
Beng Huat asserts that the government’s strategies, including 
restrictions on sensitive speech, are underpinned by a logic of 
deterrence, with the idea of ‘harmony’ used to repress and pre-empt 
public discussion which results in a “minimalist” racial harmony.275  
He adds that true harmony in a democratic society should “be 
achieved by unhindered and undistorted public debates.”276  Thus, 
restrictions on speech pertaining to race and religion may be an 
obstacle to achieving an enduring form of harmony.  Chua contends 
that the “absence of racial violence in Singapore since 1969 
suggests that the ‘danger’ of riots might have been exaggerated,” 
and that rising educational levels among the population could 
explain the fall in ethno-religious violence, 277  thus calling into 
question the need for such restrictions on speech.  In addition, the 
absence of any ethnic or religious public unrest could be partly 
attributed to the stringent limits on free assembly and expression in 
Singapore, which have suppressed all kinds of demonstrations or 
protests. 
Moreover, as with all laws, there is the risk that the law may 
not be evenly applied or that it may be misused for purposes other 
than those intended at the time of legislation.  As Neo asserts, 
prosecutions for racially and religiously sensitive speech in 
Singapore may be perceived as being disproportionately applied to 
speech against the Malay-Muslim community.278  Charges under the 
Sedition Act have mainly been regarding speech offensive to Islam 
and the Muslim community, with the government declining to 
charge a blogger for posting offensive caricatures of Jesus in 2006 
and declining to prosecute three youths who posted offensive 
content against Indians in 2010. 279   This could result in the 
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perception of unfairness and become a source of ethno-religious 
frustration.  While Amos Yee’s case serves as a counter example, 
his situation is unusual and complicated by the fact that he engaged 
in what the court deemed “obscene” behavior, and because his 
criticisms of Lee Kuan Yew prompted a number of complaints. 
Finally, when there is a law restricting religiously sensitive 
speech, there is the question of how to, and who will, decide 
whether content has contravened the law.  In the case of section 298, 
the issue is how and who decides if content has wounded religious 
feelings.  This is an issue which was also brought up in Yee’s case.  
In determining whether speech has contravened the law, it is either 
the state or the individual who decides.280  If solely in the hands of 
the state, then there is the potential for abuse.  If the individual 
decides, then, as Neo argues, “feelings are an unreliable basis upon 
which to find a constitutional violation,” thus, “a court cannot 
simply rely on the subjective feelings of the subject group,” and 
there must be an objective test.281  Otherwise, “it renders speakers 
concerned with racial and religious issues in Singapore hostage to 
the possibly irrational sensitivities of some segments of society or, 
more specifically, segments of some groups.” 282  However, this 
raises the question of what an objective test might look like.  
Regardless, in restricting a constitutional right, there must be clear 
and judicious balancing of the right to freedom of speech with the 
public interest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to highlight some relevant 
issues that have been side-lined in the current global debates on 
religiously sensitive speech.  First, while the “West” opposes the 
Defamation of Religions resolution because it restricts free speech, 
places Islam “beyond criticism,” and oppresses minorities, this 
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Article shows how laws restricting free speech have existed in the 
U.S. and continue to exist in Europe.  In the United States, 
blasphemy laws have existed for over 100 years and restricted free 
speech to protect the largely Christian population, and in Europe 
denial of Holocaust laws have placed the existence of the Holocaust 
“beyond criticism” and have been held in place to protect an 
“identifiable group based on ethnicity and religion.”283  Moreover, 
even though the Defamation of Religions resolution is considered a 
“Defamation of Islam” resolution, section 298 and its surrounding 
provisions share similar roots and aims with the Defamation of 
Religions resolution, and exist in a nation which is not a 
predominantly Islamic country. 
An examination of Singapore’s section 298 and its uses and 
effects has highlighted some considerations that should be taken 
into account in the Defamation of Religions and in the larger 
freedom of speech versus freedom of religion debates.  Religious 
harmony is a key issue in the management of religiously insensitive 
speech in Singapore.  This consideration has not been a key part of 
the debate, and the Singaporean example illustrates how it can be an 
issue in certain contexts, especially in the post-9/11 climate.  
Moreover, the Singaporean example highlights the implications of 
the U.N. Resolution by showing how a law like the one advocated 
by the U.N. Resolution may work in practice, how the presence or 
absence of a law like this may affect society, and what factors may 
influence the effects of having or not having such a law.  Much like 
the now defunct blasphemy laws in the U.S., or the denial of 
Holocaust laws in Europe, laws like section 298 are what legal 
anthropologist Moore describes as “legal interventions that reshape 
society,” which are “oriented toward forming the future.”284  At the 
same time, with these laws come the concern of “law and context” 
and “comparative situations.”285  As Moore highlights, similar laws 
placed in different social contexts can have varying local 
outcomes.286  The myriad and specific concerns with such a law in 
Singapore society illustrate the extent to which context matters. 
However, while context has significant effects on laws, they 
are both not static and unchanging.  As Moore describes, “laws, 
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inserted into ongoing social contexts undergo transformations.  Both 
law and the socio-cultural context into which they have been 
inserted are moving entities.” 287   Thus, an argument for taking 
context into account should not be interpreted as an argument for 
adhering to the past and to tradition.  In addition, while context is 
important, descriptions of context must be critically examined.  For 
instance, narratives of history are constructed and this must be 
considered in assessing the historical element of context.  In the 
Singapore case, Michael Hill argues that the state has “constructed a 
number of key myths in order to legitimate political policy and to 
mobilize social action, especially with the goal of creating 
consensus.” 288   He describes one such narrative as the one that 
“identifies persistent underlying communal tension as a possible 
source of ethnic conflict.”289  Chua Beng Huat suggests that within 
this narrative, the likelihood of such conflicts may have been 
exaggerated.290 
In this vein, the wider context must also be considered.  This 
includes Singapore’s performance in international indicators such as 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which from 
2006 to 2013 categorized Singapore as a “hybrid regime,” and since 
2014 has labeled Singapore a “flawed democracy,”291 as well as the 
description of Singapore as an authoritarian state by scholars such 
as Michael Barr, Jothie Rajah and Garry Rodan.292  Some scholars 
argue, therefore, that laws that have been described as necessary to 
protect religious harmony may have other motivations.  Jothie 
Rajah293 and Tsun Hang Tey294 suggest that the introduction of the 
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Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act may have been politically 
motivated.  Tey argues that this Act and other laws used to protect 
religious harmony like the Sedition Act and section 298A of the 
Penal Code are “part of an extensive corpus of very powerful 
legislative weapons, the choice of specific response to the situation 
on the ground is one to be exclusively determined by the executive. 
This exposes the potential arbitrariness of its employment.”295 
International news organizations reported Yee’s prosecution 
as an attempt to silence criticism of the former Prime Minister,296 
and the authorities’ handling of his case was heavily criticized by 
international human rights organizations. 297   The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of expression further said, “the mere fact 
that a form of expression was considered to be insulting to a public 
figure was not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties.”298  It 
is relevant to note here that not all cases of religiously sensitive 
speech have been prosecuted, 299  and that in 2016, Singapore’s 
Minister for Law, K. Shanmugam, stated that over the last five years, 
70% of young people under police investigation were eventually not 
charged, and that the police’s approach for young offenders is to 
“try to avoid criminalizing the young person’s conduct where 
possible,” in order to give them “a second chance” by pursuing a 
course of rehabilitation instead.300  However, Yee, a young, first-
time and non-violent offender, was prosecuted to the full extent of 
the law. 
It is relevant then to consider the two arguments that, with 
regards to religiously sensitive speech, other laws can serve the 
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same function, and that law should only play a limited role.  As 
Matthias Mahlmann states, “there is not only criminal law, but of 
course other legal, political, and cultural mechanisms for religions 
to use against critique.”301  Javier Martínez-Torrón argues that, “we 
should not lose sight of the limited role that law must play in this 
area . . . Democracy and pluralism could be more endangered by a 
possible abuse of the power to restrict free speech than by the 
potential harm that abusive forms of expression cause to religious 
beliefs.”302 
The study of the Singapore case therefore illustrates the 
reasons for and against restrictions on religiously sensitive speech, 
that arise from context-specific characteristics, to hopefully add to 
the discussion on whether freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion can coexist without infringing upon one another.  As legal 
scholar George Letsas points out, there may exist many possible 
reasons to restrict such speech.303  While he, like many scholars and 
voices in the debate, refutes the right not to be offended in one’s 
religious beliefs as a sound reason, he acknowledges that there may 
be other reasons that may justify the state restricting such speech.304  
Professor Vineeta Sinha adds that in multicultural contexts such as 
Singapore, regulating religious expression can expand and protect 
one’s religious rights, as opposed to infringe upon them.305 
What this Article ultimately shows is that while many 
consider the concept of human rights “universal,” laws that 
implicate these universal rights are, in reality, context-dependent in 
their formation, usefulness, and effects.  Rights such as freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion are complicated, and different 
contexts result in different types of legal approaches.  As opposed to 
rejecting different approaches outright, a perspective that takes into 
account context, where one seeks to understand the conditions under 
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which laws emerge and the positive and negative consequences of 
such laws in different societies, can further enrich the dialogue—
especially in this case where the discussion seems to dangerously 
hinge on becoming a “West” vs. “Islam,” or “Us vs. Them” debate. 
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